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Acronyms
• Device Under Test (DUT)
• Edge-triggered flip-flops (DFFs)
• Error Correction and Detection (EDAC)
• Finite state machine: (FSM)
• Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
• Input – output (I/O)
• Linear energy transfer (LET)
• Localized triple mode redundancy (LTMR)
• Low cost digital tester (LCDT)
• Probability of logic masking (Plogic)
• Radiation Effects and Analysis Group (REAG)
• Single event transient (SET)
• Single event upset (SEU)
• Single event upset cross-section (σSEU)
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FSMs Implemented in FPGAs Targeted 
for Critical Applications
• FSMs are used to control operational flow in FPGA 
devices.  
• Because of their ease of interpretation, FSMs simplify 
the design and verification process and consequently 
are significant components in a synchronous design. 
• By definition, the current state of an FSM is stored in 
DFFs
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• Significance: can be 
detrimental to system 
operation if an FSM 
were to change its state 
due to an SEU in one of 
its DFFs 
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Motivation: FSM Mitigation and 
SEU Testing
• Techniques have been employed to FSMs that 
either:
– correct the current state of an FSM,
– detect incorrect state transition, or
– Auto-transition to a new state if an un-mapped state is 
reached (“safe state-machine” which is very UNSAFE). 
• Currently no heavy-ion or proton SEU studies 
have been performed that measure the efficacy 
of any of these mitigation approaches.
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Overview
• Define FSMs and various mitigation strategies 
that can be applied to them.
• Discuss Goal of SEU testing:  to investigate 
mitigation efficacy while varying frequency 
and giving attention to global route SEEs.
• Discuss a scheme that can be used to test the 
efficacy of SEU FSM mitigation strategies and 
provide corresponding SEU test data
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We used the Microsemi ProASIC3 and the 
Virtex-5QV as DUTs.  Data presented is from 
the ProASIC3 SEU testing.
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Synchronous FSMs and SEUs
• A synchronous FSM utilizes 
DFFs to hold its current 
state, transitions to a next 
state controlled by a clock 
edge and combinatorial 
logic, and only accepts 
inputs that have been 
synchronized to the same 
clock
• FSM SEUs can occur  from:
– Caught data-path SETs
– DFF SEUs
– Clock/Reset SETs
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• A synchronous FSM is designed to deterministically 
transition through a pattern of defined states
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Synchronous 
FSM
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Mapping States into DFFs
• Each state of an FSM must be 
mapped into some type of encoding 
(pattern of bits) stored in DFFs
• Once the FSM state is mapped into a 
DFF state, it is considered a defined 
(legal) state
• Based on the number of DFFs used 
(N), the total number of available 
DFF state mappings is 2N
• Unmapped DFF states are 
considered  illegal states
23=8 available DFF states
5 out of the 8 states are mapped
3 out of the 8 states are unused
• Other encoding schemes can be 
employed that use more than 3 
DFFs. 
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5-State FSM Binary Encoding Example
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Example of an FSM used to control a
peripheral device
5-State FSM with each state
encoded as binary numbers.
An SEU can change current state and cause a 
catastrophic event
State 0
State 1
State 2State 3
State 4
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EDAC: Corrective FSM Mitigation
• Corrective FSM mitigation (as defined in this 
presentation) is a scheme that masks and 
corrects SEUs so that incorrect FSM state 
transitions do not occur
• Scope of presentation focuses on two 
corrective mitigation approaches:
– Localized triple modular redundancy (LTMR)
– Hamming Code-3
• Auto transitioning (“safe state-machine” ) is a 
reaction to a small subset of incorrect 
transitions (unmapped states).  They do not 
protect against incorrect transitioning and are 
not in the scope of this presentation
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Adding Corrective Mitigation
• LTMR: Triplicate each DFF and use a majority 
voter.  
– The triplication + voter is treated as one DFF
– Encoding doesn’t change
– Resultant FSM has 3 times the number of DFFs than 
the original encoding scheme.
– Combinatorial logic (not including the voters) does 
not change
• Hamming Code-3: requires a new encoding 
scheme.
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Binary versus LTMR FSMs
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Binary implementation
LTMR implementation : only 
change is each DFF is 
triplicated.  Majority voter is 
used across the triplication.  
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Synchronous LTMR FSMs and SEUs
• Triplication plus 
majority voter 
protects against 
SEUs in DFFs
• No mitigation in 
Data-path, 
consequently, 
data-path SETs can 
get caught by 
DFFs.
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• If global routes (clocks and resets) are not 
hardened, then SETs can global affect DFF states
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A closer look at a base-state
(state 0) and its companion-
states
Hamming Code-3 FSM Diagram for a 5 
Base-State FSM: Would need 5*7=35 
FSM states to be represented… 6 DFFs
State 0
State 1
State 2State 3
State 4
FSM Fault Tolerance: 
5-State Conversion to a Hamming Code-3 
FSM
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SEU Testing of FSMs:
Efficacy of mitigation while 
investigating how frequency and 
global routing affect FSM σSEUs
14
LETs lower than 10MeV*cm2/mg are used.  
Otherwise, global route SEUs dominate.
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ProASIC3 SEU Heavy-Ion Test 
Structures:
• No error detection and correction: 8-bit Binary 
Encoding:
– 256 FSM states total 
– Binary: 1 DFF per bit requires 8 DFFs
• Local triple modular redundancy (LTMR): 8-bit Binary 
Encoding:
– 256 FSM states total
– LTMR: 3 DFFs per bit requires 24 DFFs 
• Hamming Code-3: 5-bit encoding:
– 32 FSM states total
– Hamming Code-3 must represent all states plus their 
companion states and requires 9 DFFs
For statistical analysis, a large number of each of 
these FSMs are implemented.
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FSM 196
FSM 197
ProASIC3 FSM Heavy-Ion SEU General 
Test Structure Diagram
REAG Counter Array concept is used.  FSMs 
replace Counters.
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ProASIC3 Heavy-Ion FSM SEU Testing
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SEU cross-sections per FSM.  
Scale is Log-Linear 
SEU cross-sections for global 
routes: (clocks and resets). Scale is 
linear-linear 
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Novelty of SEU FSM Results
• The efficacy of previous EDAC+FSM studies was proven 
by means of theory or by fault injection in soft-
configuration SRAM Based FPGAs. Problems:
– Theory doesn’t take into account data-path SETs and 
global route upsets
– EDAC implementations with FSMs are not worth-while 
schemes in soft configuration devices.  This cannot 
be uncovered using fault injection because global 
route SETs and frequency response cannot be fully 
investigated with fault injection.
– In general, previous studies have no regard to LET 
(size of SET), global routes, or frequency of operation
• This is the first study to investigate FSM SEU response 
to heavy-ions while taking into account frequency, SETs, 
and global routing effects.  
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Conclusions
• Utilizing the Snap-Shot test scheme has shown to be a 
reliable approach for investigating FSM SEEs.
• Analysis of non-mitigated FSM data shows that it cannot 
be assumed that the FSM-σSEUs will increase across 
frequency.  
– Well mitigated (e.g., LTMR and Hamming-3) FSM-σSEUs increase 
across frequency
– Non-mitigated FSM-σSEUs decrease across frequency
• Well-mitigated FSM-σSEUs will be lower than non-mitigated 
FSM-σSEUs
• Global routing: 
– A trade should be made prior to deciding whether to use 
mitigation because the global routing SEUs may be significant 
enough to erase the gains from additional mitigation circuitry 
– At lower frequencies, mitigation will reduce global routing  σSEUs
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